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Abstract
The literature on excludable public goods has focused on the provi-
sion of those goods, but over-sighted the impacts of pricing strategies
of those goods for social welfare maximization. In this paper, using
a model of consumer heterogeneity, we compare two commonly used
pricing strategies per-unit usage pricing and bu¤et pricing of ex-
cludable public goods in terms of social welfare maximization. We
nd that bu¤et pricing gives higher social welfare than usage pricing
for the case of low consumer heterogeneity. We further nd that, un-
der uniform distribution, while bu¤et pricing is still preferred to usage
pricing for the case of low consumer heterogeneity, the opposite holds
for the case of high consumer heterogeneity. We also investigate the
conditions under which simultaneous use of usage pricing and bu¤et
pricing gives the highest social welfare.
Key Words: Excludable Public Goods, Per-unit Usage Pricing, Buf-
fet Pricing, Social Welfare Maximization
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1 Introduction
The literature on excludable public goods has focused on the provision of
those goods either by public agencies, or private rms, or public-private
Corresponding author: Chong-En Bai, School of Economics and Manage-
ment, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Telephone: (86)-10-6277-3183; email:
baichn@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn.
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partnerships, and concerned about the issues of information asymmetries
and moral hazard involved.1 It is arguable, however, that the ultimate ob-
jective for having those public goods is to maximize social welfare. The
realization of social welfare with excludable public goods, in turn, depends
on the specic pricing strategies used for the access to these goods. The case
of the Japanese national highway system provides an excellent example of
how poorly designed pricing strategy could lead to substantial losses in social
welfare. As reported by Jason Singer (2003) in the Asian Wall Street Jour-
nal on September 15, 2003 that, due to hefty toll fees, Japanese drivers tried
everything possible to avoid driving on the National highways, leaving the
National highways empty but local routes congested. Meanwhile, the City
of Chongqing in China has witnessed a signicant increase in both car reg-
istration and usage since it changed its road charges from toll fees to annual
passes on July 1, 2002.2
Despite the importance of pricing strategies for excludable public goods
and their impacts on social welfare, there is limited work on this topic. This
paper lls in the void by assuming away the issue of provision and focusing in-
stead on the comparison of various pricing strategies in terms of social welfare
generated. There are two commonly used pricing strategies for excludable
public goods: per-unit usage pricing, and bu¤et pricing where consumers can
enjoy any amount of excludable public goods for a certain period of time
once paying a lump-sum fee in advance. Using a model where consumers
di¤er in their willingness to pay, we nd that bu¤et pricing gives higher so-
cial welfare than usage pricing for the case of low consumer heterogeneity.
For a uniform distribution of consumers willingness to pay, we further nd
that while bu¤et pricing is still preferred to usage pricing for the case of low
consumer heterogeneity, the opposite holds for the case of high consumer
heterogeneity. We also extend our analysis by investigating the conditions
under which simultaneous use of usage pricing and bu¤et pricing gives the
highest social welfare.
A paper related to ours is by Nahata, Ostaszewski and Sahoo (1999).3
They compare bu¤et pricing with usage pricing in terms of prot generated
under the assumption that usage pricing involves an extra marginal cost than
bu¤et pricing does. In contrast, we do not assume an extra marginal cost
associated with usage pricing and furthermore our focus is on the comparison
1See, for example, Breithut (1939), Vickrey (1963, 1969), Winston (1991), Lee (1991),
Oum and Zhang (1990), Fraser (1996), and Cremer and La¤ont (2003).
2We thank Professors Zhang Zongyi and Yang Jun of Chongqing University for pro-
viding us with this example.
3Other related studies include the pricing of public intermediate goods (e.g., Feldstein
(1971) and, Yang (1991)), and the pricing of shared facilities (e.g., Scotchmer 1985).
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of these two pricing strategies in terms of social welfare generated.
The paper is organized as follows. The model setup for the analysis is
laid out in Section 2, and the main analysis is presented in Section 3. The
paper concludes with Section 4.
2 Model Setup
A government agency considers building an infrastructural facility (for exam-
ple, highways, museums, and parks) at a xed cost I. Once constructed, the
facility provides an excludable-public good G to a community of consumers
at zero marginal cost. Consumer demand for G is given by
qi(p) = i   p; (1)
where qi is the quantity of consumption and i represents consumer i0s highest
willingness to pay. i is private information, and the government agency only
knows its cumulative distribution function F () and the density distribution
function f(). i is assumed to lie in the support of [0   "; 0 + "], where
" 2 [0; 0] represents the degree of consumer heterogeneity.
Consider two commonly-used pricing strategies that the government agency
can use for the excludable public good G. One is the per-unit usage pricing.
Given the usage price p, only those consumers whose willingness to pay is
higher than the price (i.e., i > p) will choose to enjoy good G. Let 
p(") de-
note the set of participating consumers under usage pricing. The associated
revenue and the social welfare are(
p =
R
2
p(") pqi(p)f()d
SWp =
R
2
p(")
hR 
p
qi(t)dt

+ pqi(p)
i
f()d
(2)
The other pricing strategy is bu¤et pricing where consumers can enjoy
any amount of G once paying a lump-sum fee T in advance. It can be shown
that only those consumers with 
2
i
2
> T will choose to enjoy good G. Let

T (") denote the set of participating consumers under bu¤et pricing. The
associated revenue and the social welfare are(
T =
R
2
T (") Tf()d
SWT =
R
2
T (")
R 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d
(3)
When consumers are homogeneous (" = 0), the highest bu¤et price
chargeable is 
2
0
2
and the highest usage price chargeable is 0. It can be
shown that the maximum revenue under optimal bu¤et pricing is 
2
0
2
whereas
3
that under usage pricing is 
2
0
4
. To make the analysis non-trivial, it is assumed
that the investment cost can be recovered under this homogenous case, i.e.,
I < 
2
0
4
.
The government agencys objective is to maximize social welfare subject
to the constraint that the xed cost I can be recovered (investment recovery
constraint).
max
j
SWj
s:t: j  I (4)
where j 2 fT; pg. The government agency will choose the pricing strategy
that gives a higher social welfare.
3 Usage Pricing versus Bu¤et Pricing
In comparing the social welfare achieved under usage pricing versus that
under bu¤et pricing, it is useful to introduce the concept of full-participation,
i.e., all consumers can enjoy good G while the xed cost of investment can be
recovered. In the presence of consumer heterogeneity, the maximum bu¤et
price should be less than (0 ")
2
2
in order to have all consumers enjoy the
good G. It can be shown that, under this case, the investment cost I can
only be recovered when the degree of consumer heterogeneity is low enough
(i.e., " < "T ). Similarly, the maximum usage price for ensuring all consumers
to enjoy the good G is 0   "; and the investment cost I can be recovered if
" < "p.
Dene the case of low consumer heterogeneity as that where there is full
participation under both pricing strategies, i.e., "  minf"T ; "pg, and the
case of high consumer heterogeneity as that where full participation is not
satised in either pricing strategy, i.e., " > maxf"T ; "pg. We have:4
Proposition 1 (i) For the case of low consumer heterogeneity , social wel-
fare under optimal bu¤et pricing is higher than that under optimal usage
pricing. (ii) For the case of high consumer heterogeneity , social welfare un-
der optimal bu¤et pricing is higher than that under optimal usage pricing
when the following condition holds:Z 0+"
p
Z p
0
qi(t)dt  pqi(p)

f()d >
Z m
p
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d (5)
4All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
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where p is the optimal usage price and m =
p
2T is a transform of the
optimal bu¤et price T .
The intuition for the results is as follows. There are two sources of loss
in social welfare under either of these two pricing strategies. One is the loss
occurred when not all consumers can enjoy the good G (called Participation
Loss), and the other is the loss when the consumption level of a consumer is
below the level at zero usage price (called Consumption Loss).
For the case of low consumer heterogeneity, there is no participation loss
under either of the two pricing strategies. As for consumption loss, however,
there exists under optimal usage pricing but not under optimal bu¤et pricing.
Hence the result of Proposition 1 (i). For the case of high heterogeneity, there
are both participation loss and consumption loss under optimal usage pricing,
but there is only participation loss under optimal bu¤et pricing. Which one
has higher social welfare hinges upon condition (5), where the left side is
the consumption loss under optimal usage pricing and the right side is the
di¤erence in the participation loss between optimal bu¤et pricing and optimal
usage pricing.
Next, using a uniform distribution of consumers maximum willingness
to pay, f() = 1=2"; we can characterize the optimal pricing strategy for all
types of consumer heterogeneity:
Proposition 2 Under the uniform distribution of consumers maximum will-
ingness to pay, there exists a degree of consumer heterogeneity, " 2 (minf"T ; "pg;maxf"T ; "pg)
below which social welfare under optimal bu¤et pricing is higher than that un-
der optimal usage pricing, but above which the opposite holds.
In real-world situation, we observe the use of usage pricing and bu¤et
pricing simultaneously. For example, parks often o¤er monthly passes as
well as per entrance fees. Now we consider the choice of either pure usage
pricing, or pure bu¤et pricing, or both, and nd that simultaneous use of
both pricing strategies could be optimal in some cases.
Proposition 3 Under the uniform distribution of consumers maximum will-
ingness to pay, social welfare under optimal bu¤et pricing is the highest for
the case of low consumer heterogeneity, but the simultaneous use of bu¤et
pricing and usage pricing generates the highest social welfare for the case of
high consumer heterogeneity.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we compare two commonly used pricing strategies usage pric-
ing and bu¤et pricing of excludable public goods in terms of social welfare
maximization. Using a model where consumers di¤er in their willingness to
pay, we nd that bu¤et pricing gives higher social welfare than usage pricing
for the case of low consumer heterogeneity. For uniform distribution of con-
sumers willingness to pay, we further nd that while bu¤et pricing is still
preferred to usage pricing for the case of low consumer heterogeneity, the
opposite holds for the case of high consumer heterogeneity. We also extend
our analysis by investigating the conditions under which simultaneous use of
usage pricing and bu¤et pricing gives the highest social welfare.
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Appendix to "Excludable Public Goods:
Pricing and Social Welfare Maximization"
This Version: January 2008
Proof to Proposition 1:
(i) Case of low consumer heterogeneity (i.e."  minf"T ; "pg)
When "  minf"T ; "pg, all the consumers can enjoy the good G, thus

p(") = 
T (") = [0 "; 0+"] and the associated social welfare under usage
pricing and bu¤et pricing are:8<: SWp =
R 0+"
0 "
hR 
p
qi(t)dt

+ pqi(p)
i
f()d
SWT =
R 0+"
0 "
R 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d
(1)
where p is the minimum value to satisfy that p =
R 0+"
0 " pqi(p)f()d = I
since @SWp=@p < 0 and p 2 (0; 0   "].
To compare the social welfare under two pricing strategies we simply get
SWT   SWp =
Z 0+"
0 "
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d  
Z 0+"
0 "
Z 
p
qi(t)dt

+ pqi(p)

f()d
=
Z 0+"
0 "
Z 
0
qi(t)dt 
Z 
p
qi(t)dt

f()d  
Z 0+"
0 "
pqi(p)f()d
=
Z 0+"
0 "
Z p
0
qi(t)dt 
Z p
0
qi(p)dt

f()d > 0 (2)
while the last inequality follows from the fact that qi(t) > qi(p) when t 2 (0; p)
for all i.
(ii) Case of high consumer heterogeneity ( " > maxf"T ; "pg).
We start with the bu¤et pricing. Under current circumstance, only those
consumers with high willingness to pay (i.e. 
2
i
2
 T where T is the bu¤et
price) will choose to enjoy the good G. Thus 
T (") = [m; 0 + "], and the
1
associated revenue and social welfare are(
T =
R 0+"
m
m2
2
f()d
SWT =
R 0+"
m
R 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d
(3)
where m =
p
2T and m > 0   ". Since @SWT=@m < 0, it is easy
to derive m = m("), where m is the minimum value to satisfy T =R 0+"
m
m2
2
f()d = I. Thus the social welfare under the bu¤et pricing is
SWT =
R 0+"
m
R 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d.
Similarly, it is easy to derive the social welfare under the usage pricing
SWp =
R 0+"
p
hR 
p qi(t)dt+ p
qi(p)
i
f()d, where p = p(") is the minimum
value satisfying p =
R 0+"
p
pqi(p)f()d = I.
Thus the comparison of the social welfare under the bu¤et pricing and
that under the usage pricing is
SWT   SWp =
Z 0+"
m
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d  
Z 0+"
p
Z 
p
qi(t)dt+ p
qi(p)

f()d
=
Z 0+"
m
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d  
Z 0+"
p
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d
+
Z 0+"
p
Z 
0
qi(t)dt 
Z 
p
qi(t)dt  pqi(p)

f()d (4)
=
Z p
m
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d +
Z 0+"
p
Z p
0
qi(t)dt  pqi(p)

f()d
where the rst term of the right hand in the last equation measures the
di¤erence in participation loss between bu¤et pricing and usage pricing, and
the second term measures the consumption loss under usage pricing. Thus
the social welfare under the bu¤et pricing is higher than that under the usage
pricing is if and only if the following condition holds:Z 0+"
p
Z p
0
qi(t)dt  pqi(p)

f()d >
Z m
p
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d (5)
Proof to Proposition 2:
We rst will calculate the threshold points "p and "T .
Lemma A.1.: There exists a threshold point "T = 0  
p
2I under bu¤et
pricing that when " 2 [0; "T ], all the consumers can enjoy the excludable
2
public good G; when " 2 ("T ; 0], only those consumers with high willingness
to pay can enjoy the good G.
Proof: In order to let all the consumers enjoy the good G, the maximum
chargeable bu¤et price is T (") =
(0 ")2
2
and so the maximum revenue col-
lectable. T (") is a monotonically decreasing function of ". When " = 0,
T (") =
20
2
> I; and when " = 0, T (") = 0 < I. So there must exist a
point "T at which T =
(0 ")2
2
= I, and "T = 0  
p
2I.
Lemma A.2.: These exists a threshold point "p =
0+
p
20 4I
2
under usage
pricing that when " 2 [0; "p], all the consumers can enjoy the excludable
public good G; when " 2 ("p; 0], only those consumers with high willingness
to pay can enjoy the good G.
Proof: Under full participation, the revenue under usage pricing is
p =
Z 0+"
0 "
pqi(p)f()d = p(0   p) (6)
There are two constraints needed to be satised: p  I and p  0   ".
Let h(p) = p(0   p)   I =  p2 + 0p   I. It is easy to see that when
p 2 [p1; p2], the xed cost I can be recovered, where p1; p2 are the solutions
to p2  0p+ I = 0 and p1 < p2. Next, to consider the constraint p  0  ",
we insert 0   " into function h(p) and get h(0   ") =  "2 + 0"   I. It is
easy to see that when " 2 ["1; "2], h(0   ")  0; when " 2 [0; "1) [ ("2; 0],
h(0   ") < 0, where "1; "2 are the solutions to "2   0"+ I = 0 and "1 < "2.
Combing the characteristics of h(p) and h(0   "), we show that:
If " 2 [0; "1), 0   " > p2 as 0   " > 02 and h(0   ") < 0. Thus these
two constraints can be satised, and p1 is picked as the optimal usage price
since @SWp=@p < 0;
If " 2 ["1; "2], p2  0  "  p1 as h(0  ")  0. Since p1 is allowed under
this circumstance, these two constraints can be satised;
If " 2 ("2; 0], 0   " < p1 as 0   " < 02 and h(0   ") < 0. Thus the
these two constraints can not be satised simultaneously.
Thus in order to realize the full participation, we must have " 2 [0; "2].
Next, if not all consumers can enjoy the excludable public good G, the
revenue is then
p =
Z 0+"
p
pqi(p)f()d =
p
4"
(0 + "  p)2 (7)
and there are also two constraints related: p  I and p > 0   ".
3
Let g(p) = p(0 + "   p)2   4"I. From the characteristics of g(p) and
g(0  "), we can similarly derive that in order to satisfy the two constraints,
we must have " 2 ["1; 0] and the optimal usage price charged is p = p(") 2 
0; 1
3
(0 + ")

.
Finally, we consider the case when " 2 ["1; "2], which is the overlap be-
tween the condition under full participation and that under not full partic-
ipation. As shown in the above analysis, the government agency P charges
either a low price p = p1 for the case of full participation or a high price
p = p for the case of not full participation so as to maximize the social wel-
fare and meet all the constraints. It is easy to show that SW (p1) > SW (p).
So when " 2 ["1; "2], the government agency P will charge a low price p = p1
and all the consumers can enjoy the good G.
Thus the threshold point is "p = "2 =
0+
p
20 4I
2
.
It is easy to see that "p > "T . Next, we compare the social welfare under
the usage pricing and that under the bu¤et pricing in three cases: the case of
low consumer heterogeneity, the case of middle consumer heterogeneity, and
the case of high consumer heterogeneity.
Case of low consumer heterogeneity (i.e. "  "T ): there are full partici-
pation under both usage pricing and bu¤et pricing. According to Proposition
1, the social welfare under the bu¤et pricing is higher than that under the
usage pricing.
Case of high consumer heterogeneity (i.e., "p  "): a simple calculation
shows that:
SWT   SWp =
Z p
m
Z 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d +
Z 0+"
p
Z p
0
qi(t)dt  pqi(p)

f()d
=
1
12"
[(0 + ")
3  m3   (0 + "  p)2(0 + "+ p)]
=
 x
12"

p2   2xp + 2m2   m
3
x

(8)
where m = m(") 2 (0; 2
3
(0 + ")) is a transform of the optimal bu¤et price
T , p = p(") 2 (0; 1
3
(0 + ") is the optimal usage price, and x = 0 + ".
Having T (m) = p(p) = I, we can get p(0 + "   p)2 = (0 + "  
m)m2, which is equivalent to [p + m   x][p2   (x + m)p + m2] =
0. Since p + m < x, p2   (x + m)p + m2 = 0, which leads to the
solution p =
x+m 
p
(x+m)2 4m2
2
(the other solution is rejected as p =
x+m+
p
(x+m)2 4m2
2
> x)
4
Insert p =
x+m 
p
(x+m)2 4m2
2
back into equation (8), we get
SWT   SWp = 1
12"
[(0 + ")
3  m3   (0 + "  p)2(0 + "+ p)]
=
 x
12"

p2   2xp + 2m2   m
3
x

(9)
Let l(p) = p2   2xp + 2m2   m3
x
. It can be shown that when p < p^,
l(p) > 0; when p > p^, l(p) < 0, where p^ = x  
q
1
x
(x3   2m2x+m3).
Furthermore, It is easy to prove that p < p^. Thus we get
SWT   SWp =  x
12"
l(p) < 0 (10)
which means for the case of high consumer heterogeneity, the social welfare
under the usage pricing is higher than that under the bu¤et pricing.
Case of middle consumer heterogeneity (i.e. "T < " < "p), there is full
participation under the usage pricing but not full participation under the
bu¤et pricing. The social welfare function under the usage pricing and the
bu¤et pricing are8<: SWp =
R 0+"
0 "
hR 
p
qi(t)dt

+ pqi(p)
i
f()d = 1
6
[320 + "
2   3p2]
SWT =
R 0+"
m
R 
0
qi(t)dt

f()d = 1
12"
[(0 + ")
3  m3]
(11)
wherem =
p
2T . According to the results in the previous two cases, we know
that when " = "T , SWT > SWp and when " = "p, SWT < SWp. Moreover,
both SWT and SWp are monotonically increasing in ". Thus there must
exist a threshold point " that when " 2 ("T ; ") ; SWT > SWp and when
" 2 ("; "p], SWT < SWp.
Combined the results in these three cases, we can get that when when
" 2 (0; ") ; SWT > SWp and when " 2 ["; 0], SWT < SWp.
Proof to Proposition 3:
For the case of low consumer heterogeneity, there are full participation
under both the usage pricing and the bu¤et pricing. Since there is no so-
cial welfare loss under the bu¤et pricing and usage pricing may induce the
consumption loss, the pure bu¤et pricing is the dominant pricing strategy.
For the case of high consumer heterogeneity, both the usage pricing and
the bu¤et pricing exclude some consumers with low willingness to pay to
enjoy the excludable public good G. As shown in the previous analysis, the
social welfare under the usage pricing is higher than that under the bu¤et
5
pricing. Thus we only need to see if it is Pareto improvement to introduce the
bu¤et pricing upon the optimal usage pricing (i.e. p = p 2  0; 1
3
(0 + ")

)
First, consider the choice of originally participating consumers. Now they
have an additional choice that is whether to pay the bu¤et price and enjoy
the maximum consumption or to pay the usage price. The choice depends
on the comparison of consumer surplus under these two pricing strategies.
Specically, when 
2
i
2
 T 0  (i p)2
2
, the consumer i will pay the bu¤et price,
where p is the optimal usage price and T
0
is the lump-sum fee charged;
otherwise, the consumer i will use the usage pricing.
Dene n =
p
2T 0. We now have three groups of consumers: when
i 2 [0   "; p), consumers do not use the good G; when i
h
p; n
2+(p)2
2p

,
consumers pay the usage price; when i 2
h
n2+(p)2
2p ; 0 + "
i
, consumers pay
the bu¤et pricing.1 And the associated revenue is
(n; p) =
Z n2+(p)2
2p
p
p(   p)f()d +
Z 0+"
n2+(p)2
2p
n2
2
f()d
=
1
16p"
[n2   (p)2]2 + 1
8p"

2p(0 + ")  n2   (p)2

(12)
where n is set to just recover the xed cost I, i.e. (n; p) = I. Since
p =
p
4"
(0 + "  p)2 = I = (n; p), we can have the following equation:2
n =

2p(0 + ")  3(p)2
1=2
(13)
Given n and p, it is easy to see that:
SW (n; p) =
Z n2+(p)2
2p
p
2   (p)2
2
f()d +
Z 0+"
n2+(p)2
2p
2
2
f()d
=
1
12"

(0 + ")
3   3
2
pn2 +
1
2
(p)3

> SWp =
1
12"
(0 + "  p)2(0 + "+ 2p) (14)
However, the original pricing issue is that the government agency P
chooses a optimal pricing structure (n; p) to maximize the social welfare
1To make the analysis interesting, the transformed bu¤et price, n should be higher than
the optimal usage price, p. Otherwise, all the consumers will choose to pay the bu¤et fee
and the situation is reduced to the pure bu¤et pricing situation, which is dominated by
the pure usage pricing.
2Another solution, n =

2p(0 + ")  (p)2
1=2
, is deleted since the social welfare is a
decreasing function of n.
6
SW (n; p), given the constraint that the xed cost I can be recovered, i.e.,
(n; p) = I. Denote the optimal choice as (~n; ~p), we have:
SW (~n; ~p)  SW (n; p) > SWp (15)
So for the case of high consumer heterogeneity, the simultaneous use of bu¤et
pricing and usage pricing generates the highest social welfare.
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